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Te predictive power
of merger analysis
By JOHN B. KIRKWOOD*
This article looks first at the process courts use to resolve merger
challenges and finds that in the area of product market definition,
merger analysis is reasonably strong. Market definition remains
complex and subjective, however, and could be improved, or avoided
altogether, through econometric techniques such as merger
simulation. Judicial analysis of entry is much weaker. Courts ask
whether the market is protected by entry barriers but rarely ask
whether the barriers are high enough to make entry unprofitable.
The article also examines the results of "marginal" mergers,
mergers that would have been blocked had the government and
courts been somewhat more aggressive. Measured in this way,
merger analysis is not seriously off target: the merger retrospectives
find that very few transactions led to sharp price changes. They also
find, however, that a large proportion of marginal mergers resulted in
small price increases, which suggests that in appropriate cases,
enforcement agencies and courts should be more willing to predict
anticompetitive effects.
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Seattle
University School of Law; Editor, Research in Law and Economics; Senior Fellow,
American Antitrust Institute; former Assistant Director for Planning and Assis-
tant Director for Evaluation, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Bert Foer and Maurice Stucke reviewed prior versions of this arti-
cle and made excellent suggestions. Alexander Jouravlev provided meticulous
research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Merger analysis is typically an exercise in prediction. Although the
federal government sometimes challenges a consummated merger,'
the vast majority of federal cases involve proposed mergers, and their
competitive effects can only be predicted.2 As we will see, this feature
tends to make merger analysis difficult and complex, but it does not
make it impossible or wildly inaccurate. To the contrary, as I explain in
this article, current merger analysis, even when practiced by generalist
judges, is frequently sophisticated and reasonably accurate. It is not,
however, usually simple, completely objective, or always correct. As a
result, there is room for improvement, both in how courts appraise
mergers and in the government's evaluation of a possible challenge.
The most promising sources of improvement are two econometric
techniques-merger simulation and merger retrospectives. Merger
simulation, a way to model the likely impact of a merger, is the most
promising innovation in merger analysis in recent years. As this tech-
nique is refined, it could enhance the predictive power of merger
analysis substantially. Merger retrospectives, in contrast, are economic
studies of past mergers, and they have consistently, though not uni-
formly, found that the mergers they studied led to significant-but not
dramatic-price increases. As I explain below, this pattern has two
implications: it indicates that merger analysis has not been seriously
off target, but it also suggests that in appropriate cases, courts and
enforcement agencies ought to be more willing to predict competitive
I For a well-known recent example, see In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare
Corp., 2007-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,814 (Comm'n Decision Aug. 2, 2007).
2 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINEs § 1, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Apr. 2, 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 113,104 (as revised Apr. 8, 1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES] ("Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assess-
ment of what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will
likely happen if it does not."); Alison Oldale, Behavioral Economics and Merger
Analysis, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 139, 142 (2010) ("merger control is all about
predicting firm behavior"); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger
Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better? 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 537, 538 (2007) ("Each of [the steps in a merger review] involves making pre-
dictions based on incomplete information about current or future facts, predic-
tions that are almost inevitably subject to a high degree of uncertainty.").
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harm. Placing more emphasis on merger retrospectives-giving more
weight to those already conducted and conducting more of them in the
future-may increase the accuracy of merger enforcement significantly.
In the remainder of this article, I appraise the predictive power of
merger analysis as it is currently practiced and identify areas for improve-
ment. In part II, I set the stage by noting that the pertinent statutes-sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act and section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act)-allow the government, and particularly the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to stop a proposed merger without
showing that the merger is "likely" to reduce competition. Instead, all the
government must prove is that there is a "reasonable probability" of com-
petitive harm. In predicting the likelihood that a merger will be anticom-
petitive, in short, the courts need to find a substantial probability of harm,
but that probability does not have to exceed fifty percent.
In part III, I address how the courts apply this standard. Because
the process of merger litigation is familiar to most readers, I focus on
just two issues, product market definition and the likelihood of entry,
and three recent cases, Whole Foods,' Oracle,' and Staples.5 This brief
review, however, is more than sufficient to illuminate the essence of
the process: in order to predict the competitive consequences of a
merger, courts look at the relevant issues from multiple perspectives.
Because judges are rarely comfortable resting their decisions on a sin-
gle category of evidence, they use a variety of evidentiary tools,
weighing each for its relevance and probative value.' By its nature,
this process is difficult, complex, and judgmental, leaving courts in
most cases without a clear, objective answer. Given our current state
of knowledge, however, there is no escape from this imperfect and
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
6 The pricing evidence in Staples is the closest thing the courts have
found in recent years to a single, dispositive category of evidence. But even
that evidence could not be relied upon without evaluating alternative explana-
tions for it. See infra part Ill.A.2. Moreover, even though Judge Hogan rejected
all the alternative explanations, he still did not rely exclusively on the pricing
evidence. To the contrary, in defining the relevant product market, he exam-
ined many other types of evidence as well. See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073-81.
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subjective process.! But it can be improved. Product market definition
can be enhanced, if not avoided altogether, through better and more
frequent use of merger simulations. Entry analysis can be made more
rigorous by requiring defendants, if they contend that entry is easy, to
establish that new entry would be profitable.' And the entire process
can be made more precise by conducting more merger retrospectives
and applying the results to the review of proposed mergers.
In part IV, I look in more detail at the merger retrospectives and
assess their implications for merger control. If the predictive power of
merger analysis was low-if the government and the courts were
unable to determine with any precision which mergers were likely to be
anticompetitive-then mergers that are not challenged would vary dra-
matically in their outcomes, from large price increases to huge price
reductions. The merger retrospectives do not find this. Instead, they con-
clude that most "marginal" mergers-mergers that would have been
halted had the government and the courts been somewhat more aggres-
sive-led to small but significant price increases. This relatively narrow
band of results suggests that the predictive power of merger analysis is
not seriously deficient. At the same time, however, the predominance of
price increases in the retrospectives suggests that courts and agencies
may be systematically underpredicting competitive harm. To be sure,
the retrospectives are not a random sample of all marginal mergers, and
their results cannot be used to justify a general escalation of merger
enforcement. But in appropriate cases, they may supply a significant
additional reason to block a merger.9
7 See Ken Heyer, Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening
to Customers, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 89 (2007) ("Virtually all forms of evidence
are subject to criticism of one sort or another, as are the inferences one
attempts to draw from them. While this article focuses primarily on the testi-
mony of customers, it recognizes that there are no simple, foolproof, altema-
tives. Ultimately, it is the difficult task of competition authorities and the
courts to weigh the totality of the evidence put before them.").
8 See John B. Kirkwood & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability:
Reinvigorating the Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 39
(2009).
9 This article evaluates the ability of the courts and enforcement agencies
to predict the competitive impact of a proposed merger. It does not evaluate the
ability of merging parties to predict the decisions of courts or agencies. The two
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In part V, I summarize these conclusions and propose areas for
further development.
II. THE INCIPIENCY STANDARDS OF MERGER LAW
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits one company from acquiring
the stock or assets of another company "where in any line of commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.""o The italicized language indicates that a
court may halt a merger or acquisition even if the evidence does not
show that the transaction "will be" anticompetitive or is "likely to be"
harmful. Under section 7, a court may enjoin a merger if the govern-
ment can establish that the transaction "may be" anticompetitive.
Congress used this language to allow the government and the
courts to stop competitive problems in their "incipiency" "-that is,
before they had grown to substantial proportions. It was also
intended to reach mergers whose anticompetitive effects were proba-
ble but not certain.12 Taken literally, however, the "may be" language
is even broader: it authorizes courts to halt mergers when there is
only a small possibility of competitive harm." In such cases, the likeli-
types of prediction are different, and steps to enhance the latter-such as
clearer rules of law or simpler enforcement guidelines-may impair the former.
10 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2010) (emphasis added).
"1 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § I ("these Guide-
lines reflect the Congressional intent that merger enforcement should inter-
dict competitive problems in their incipiency"). In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962), the Court stated that because of a "rising
tide of economic concentration-[Congress wanted mergers to be halted] at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was
still in its incipiency." See also Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From
Von's Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875, 876-77 (2001).
12 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 1 ("certainty about
anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be
illegal").
13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAM, IV ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALY-
SIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION [ 905b, at 31 (3d ed. 2009) (sec-
tion 7's "prohibition of mergers where the effect 'may be' substantially to lessen
competition is extremely open and may even have been thought to condemn any
merger where a lessening of competition is merely possible").
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hood that the merger is procompetitive is much higher. To avoid such
perverse results, the courts have not read section 7 literally; instead,
they have insisted that the government prove that a substantial less-
ening of competition is "reasonably likely." 4 While the cases have not
assigned a specific number to that term-they have not, for example,
stated that the government must establish that the probability of
harm exceeds thirty percent-the insertion of the word "reasonably"
into the standard indicates that the government can prevail even
though the likelihood of harm is less than fifty-one percent. Other-
wise, the courts would declare that the government must establish
that a substantial lessening of competition is "likely" or "probable" or
"more likely than not." No recent decision has employed such a test.
When the FTC seeks a preliminary injunction, the probability of
harm it must establish may be even lower. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act
authorizes the FTC to request, and a court to grant, a preliminary injunc-
tion after the court considers, among other things, the FTC's "likelihood
of success."" After some disagreement, the courts have now settled on a
single test to determine whether the FTC has shown a sufficient likeli-
hood of success: a court may grant the injunction as long as the FTC
"has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult
and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation,
study, deliberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance
and ultimately by the Court of Appeals."" This "substantial questions"
14 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964) (a section
7 violation is established when "the 'reasonable likelihood' of a substantial less-
ening of competition in the relevant market is shown"); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v.
FTC, 807 F2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Section 7 does not require proof that a
merger or other acquisition [will] cause higher prices in the affected market. All
that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable danger of such conse-
quences in the future."); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1109
(N.D. Cal. 2004) ("To establish a section 7 violation, plaintiffs must show that a
pending acquisition is reasonably likely to cause anticompetitive effects.").
" See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2010).
16
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 E3d 708, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Free-
man Hosp., 69 E3d 260, 267 (8th Cir. 1995); FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938
F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1162
(9th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Tatel, J., concurring); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F Supp. 1066, 1071 (D.D.C. 1997).
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test allows the FTC to block mergers, at least temporarily, without show-
ing that a violation of section 7 is more likely than not.
In theory, therefore, the Commission may obtain a preliminary
injunction merely by raising substantial questions as to whether it could
later (in an administrative proceeding) show that the challenged merger
is "reasonably likely" to be anticompetitive. That is, the FTC could halt
the merger simply by proving there is a substantial chance it could later
establish a substantial chance that the transaction is anticompetitive. In
short, section 7 and section 13(b), when read together, imply that the
Commission can prevail in a preliminary injunction action even though
the ultimate probability of competitive harm is quite low."
It is far from clear, however, that the courts routinely grant the
FTC's requests for a preliminary injunction when the probability of a
lessening of competition is so modest. After all, a preliminary injunc-
tion usually spells the end of the transaction, since most merging par-
ties are unwilling to wait for the FTC (and often an appellate court as
well) to render a final ruling on whether the merger violates section 7.11
17 Suppose that the FTC can satisfy section 13(b) if it shows there is a sub-
stantial chance (say forty percent) that it can establish a violation of section 7
in an administrative proceeding. And suppose the FTC can establish a "rea-
sonable likelihood" of competitive harm in the administrative proceeding (and
thus make out a violation) if it can prove that the likelihood of harm is thirty
percent. If so, the FTC would be entitled to a preliminary injunction even
though the ultimate probability of harm was only twelve percent (forty per-
cent of thirty percent). Similarly, if section 7 and section 13(b) each required a
probability of fifty percent, the ultimate probability of harm would be only
twenty-five percent. See Thomas A. Lambert, Four Lessons from the Whole Foods
Case, 31 REGULATION 22, 29 (2008) ("The FTC must establish only a 50 percent
likelihood that there is a 50 percent chance that the merger would substantially
lessen competition. This effectively means that a preliminary injunction may
be granted if the FTC can show facts establishing a 25 percent likelihood that
the challenged merger will substantially reduce competition.").
18 See Jonathan B. Baker & Robert Pitofsky, A Turning Point in Merger
Enforcement: Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, in ANTITRUST STORIES 311
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) ("[Tjhe award of a preliminary
injunction usually means the end of the deal in practical terms" because
"mergers are time sensitive: a long pending transaction held up by govern-
ment review in a full trial can have an adverse effect on the morale of execu-
tives and staff, adversely affect stock market prices, and harm firm
reputations (particularly of the acquired firm) in the marketplace.").
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As a result, courts may well treat a preliminary injunction action as
an action for a permanent injunction and implicitly apply the stan-
dard for a violation, not the section 13(b) standard, in deciding
whether to issue a preliminary injunction. Indeed, a number of
courts have expressly declared that they will award a preliminary
injunction only if the FTC satisfies the standard for a violation. In
Staples, for example, although Judge Hogan quoted the section
13(b) standard, he also announced: "[I]n a suit for a preliminary
injunction, the government [must] show that there is a 'reasonable
probability' that the challenged transaction will substantially
impair competition."" Other courts have imposed the same
requirement.2 0
In appraising the predictive power of merger analysis, therefore, I
will not assume that the probability threshold is lower in an FITC case
than in a Justice Department case. But whether or not that is the right
course, the main point is that both federal enforcement agencies may
establish a violation of section 7 without showing that the transaction
is "likely" to be anticompetitive. Some probability of harm short of
fifty-one percent is sufficient.
One other complication should be mentioned. I have treated
merger analysis so far as if there were only two possibilities-the pro-
posed merger will be either anticompetitive or procompetitive-and
the task of the enforcement agencies and the courts is to determine
whether there is a reasonable probability of the anticompetitive out-
come. As Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski have pointed out,
however, this is an oversimplification. A merger may have a variety of
consequences, some positive, some negative, some immediate, some
remote, some larger, some smaller, some with a higher probability,
some with a lower probability. The proper way to predict the compet-
itive impact of a merger is to identify each consequence and calculate
a "net expected value" by weighting each consequence by its size,
direction, probability, and timing, and then adding up all the
9 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1072.
20 See FTC v. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); Fruehauf
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2009).
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weighted consequences.21 Katz and Shelanski recognize that this theo-
retically precise approach may be beyond the capacity of judges, who
may be "incapable of calculating expected values with any degree of
reliability or accuracy."' But whether or not judges have the ability to
perform the proper calculations, they do not do so now. As a result, in
describing their approach, I will assume, as they do, that there are
only two outcomes-one anticompetitive and one procompetitive-
and their charge is to determine whether the anticompetitive outcome
is reasonably likely.2 3
III. THE LITIGATION PROCESS
Courts determine whether a merger is reasonably likely to reduce
competition by working through the elements of merger analysis,
beginning with market definition and ending with efficiencies. I will
illustrate the process by focusing on two elements: product market
definition, the first issue and the one that receives the most attention,
and the likelihood of entry, a subsequent step that is often handled
more perfunctorily.
A. Product market definition
Market definition draws so much attention not only because it is
the first step in merger analysis but also because it is frequently deci-
21 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 2. They describe the conventional
approach as follows: "At least in litigation, the agencies generally put forth a
single likely scenario concerning concentration and competitive effects; they
do not specify a distribution of possible, probability-weighted outcomes and
explain why that range of outcomes justifies enforcement." Id. at 547. Katz
and Shelanski argue that "the standard tools of decision theory offer a better
approach. Specifically, the agencies and courts should: Account for uncer-
tainty by estimating probability for various events and then calculating net
expected benefits...." Id. at 571.
22 Id. at 554.
23 In the case of a merger that is likely to start or continue a trend toward
concentration-the principal basis for the incipiency standard of section 7-
the merger might be stopped even though it would not, by itself, be anticom-
petitive. No recent decision, however, has enjoined a merger on this ground.
Instead, judges evaluate whether the merger they are reviewing would on its
own create a reasonable probability of lessening competition.
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sive. Indeed, market definition may be the most important single
issue in all of antitrust law. Jonathan Baker states: "Throughout the
history of U.S. antitrust litigation, the outcome of more cases has
surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive
issue."24
The purpose of market definition is to help assess market power,
the ability of a firm (or group of firms) to profitably raise price above
the competitive level. More precisely, in the case of a merger, the pur-
pose of market definition is to assess whether the merged firm could
profitably raise price above the level that would have prevailed in the
absence of the merger.5 Product market definition helps assess such
power by dividing the range of competing or potentially competing
products into those that would prevent a significant postmerger price
increase and those that would not. Those that would not are deemed
to be outside the relevant product market. Those that would are
deemed to be within the relevant market.
24 Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007); see also FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d
1028, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("As in many antitrust cases, the analysis comes
down to one issue: market definition.") (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
2 The customary practice is to discuss market power (and, indeed, all of
merger analysis) as if the only variable of interest was price. For simplicity, I
will follow this practice, but that does not mean that nonprice variables like
service, quality, innovation, or variety may not be equally or more important
in a particular case. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 1
("For simplicity of exposition, these Guidelines generally discuss the analysis
in terms of . . . price effects. Enhanced market power can also be manifested
in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including
reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or dimin-
ished innovation.").
In the case of a consummated merger, market definition may be unneces-
sary if there is direct evidence of the exercise of market power-for example,
evidence that the merger caused an anticompetitive price increase or an anti-
competitive reduction in consumer choice. See id. § 2.1.1 ("When evaluating a
consummated merger, [evidence] of observed post-merger price increases or
other changes adverse to customers is given substantial weight. The [Depart-
ment of Justice and the FTC] evaluate whether such changes are anticompet-
itive effects resulting from the merger, in which case they can be
dispositive.").
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Merger analysis has developed a theoretically rigorous tool for
making this determination. This tool, the hypothetical monopolist
test, is set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
[The test] requires that a product market contain enough substitute prod-
ucts so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of market power sig-
nificantly exceeding that existing absent the merger. Specifically, the test
requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price
regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products
("hypothetical monopolist") likely would impose at least a small but signif-
icant and non-transitory increase in pnce ... on at least one product in the
market, including at least one product sold by one of the merging firms.26
In essence, the hypothetical monopolist test asks whether a single
firm could profitably raise price if it controlled all the products within
a tentative or candidate relevant market. If it could, the tentative mar-
ket is the relevant product market. If not, the tentative market must be
expanded, for products outside the tentative market would constrain
the exercise of postmerger market power.
The difficulty in product market definition is in applying this test-
predicting which products, if any, beyond those produced by the merg-
ing firms would prevent a postmerger price increase. Where the number
of possible substitutes is large, where those products are differentiated
from each other in relatively minor ways, or where both complications
are present, it can be a challenge to decide which products are inside and
which are outside the relevant market. As Baker notes, "market bound-
aries are difficult to draw . . . in industries in which firms are differenti-
ated in product ... space, particularly when those spaces are densely
packed with large numbers of sellers differentiated by small degrees."'
In order to deal with this challenging but pivotal issue, courts typ-
ically examine many different types of evidence, ranging from the rel-
26 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.1.1.
27 Baker, supra note 24, at 131. When courts press ahead, despite these
difficulties, and draw a single market boundary, the resulting conclusion may
be mistaken or misleading. See Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant
Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1812-13 (1990)
("The tendency to see relevant market definition as an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion rather than as an array of estimates with no market description being
exactly right has led to the most serious errors in antitrust enforcement.").
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atively simple (e.g., product descriptions) to the very sophisticated
(e.g., merger simulations). Courts use multiple evidentiary tools
because no single tool is likely to be dispositive." While a particular
category of evidence may be highly indicative, there are normally
other explanations for it, or other inferences that could be drawn from
it, and as a result, fact finders ordinarily examine the issue from mul-
tiple perspectives before reaching a conclusion. In the following sur-
vey, I identify the principal types of evidence courts use to resolve the
product market issue and briefly appraise their utility.
1. PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS Courts ordinarily begin their analysis of
product market definition by describing the product or products in
the government's relevant market and comparing them to the
products the defendants want to add. This simple exercise not only
sets the stage for the more complicated analysis that follows but may
itself shed significant light on the ultimate issue. If the government's
products are quite different, physically and functionally, from the
products the defendants want to include, there is good reason to
suspect that the defendants' products would not constrain a price
increase on the government's products and should be excluded from
the relevant market.
Perhaps the best known example of this logic is in Staples, where
the product market issue was whether the relevant market could be
confined to office supply superstores or whether it also had to include
other retailers of office supplies. To resolve that issue, Judge Hogan
visited both retail formats and was struck by the differences:
Based on the Court's observations, the Court finds that the unique combi-
nation of size, selection, depth and breadth of inventory offered by the
superstores distinguished them from other retailers.... No one entering
Staples or Office Depot would mistakenly think he or she was in Best Buy
or CompUSA. You certainly know an office superstore when you see
one.2
Similarly, in Whole Foods Judge Brown pointed to both physical and
intangible distinctions between conventional supermarkets and "pre-
mium natural and organic supermarkets":
28 See supra note 6.
29 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1079 (D.D.C. 1997).
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It was undisputed that Whole Foods and Wild Oats provide higher levels
of customer service than conventional supermarkets, a "unique environ-
ment," and a particular focus on the "core values" these customers
espoused. The FTC connected these intangible properties with concrete
aspects of the [premium natural and organic supermarkets] model, such
as a much larger selection of natural and organic products, and a much
greater concentration of perishables than conventional supermarkets.'
In Oracle, moreover, Judge Walker rejected the government's market
definition in part because he felt the government had failed to articu-
late clear differences between the characteristics of "high function"
enterprise-planning software and those of "mid-market" software.31
Judge Walker's analysis rested on the proposition that products
are likely to be in the same market if there are no significant physical,
functional, or intangible differences between them. The reverse, how-
ever, is not necessarily true. Products A and B may be physically and
functionally differentiated, but the relative price levels of the two
products may reflect this differentiation. As a result, a price increase
on product A may drive large numbers of customers to product B,
and this shift may render the price increase unprofitable. In Whole
Foods, the dissenting judge relied on this reasoning when he wrote:
"So-called organic supermarkets are engaged in product differentia-
tion; they do not constitute a product market separate from all super-
markets."3 2 Differences in product characteristics, therefore, are
unlikely to be dispositive of the market definition issue, unless they
are either very large or almost nonexistent.
2. PRICE DIFFERENCES Price differences between products are like
differences in product characteristics: they can suggest, perhaps
strongly, that two products are in different markets, but they do not
prove the point. In contrast, price differences between geographical
markets can be powerful evidence. In Staples, Judge Hogan found it
"compelling"" that "in markets where Staples faces no office
30 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
31 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1139 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
32 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1056 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
3 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1081.
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superstore competition at all, something which was termed a one firm
market during the hearing, prices are 13% higher than in three firm
markets where it competes with both Office Depot and OfficeMax."4
This kind of evidence-that prices are higher in geographic markets
in which there are fewer sellers of the product-strongly suggests that
the product is a separate market.
The problem, as Judge Hogan recognized, is that there may be
other explanations for this pricing pattern. For example, prices may be
higher in geographic markets with only one office superstore chain
because costs are higher and demand is lower in those markets, and
those features explain why only one superstore chain has entered those
markets." In fact, Judge Hogan rejected all the alternative explanations
and concluded that the higher prices in one-superstore markets
reflected the market power of the superstore chain in those markets. 6
The issue was important enough, however, that all the parties
poured resources into econometric analyses of the price differences,
hoping to show through their regressions that costs or other alterna-
tive explanations either did or did not account for the price variations.
Despite the scale of the effort," Judge Hogan did not even mention,
much less rely on, any of these regressions,' suggesting that none of
them employed a model and a set of data that were free from dispute.
3 Id. at 1075-76.
3 See id. at 1084 (Defendants argued that the price "differentials are the
result of a host of factors other than superstore competition. As examples ...
the defendants offered sales volume, product mix, marketing or advertising
costs, and distribution costs."); see also Baker & Pitofsky, supra note 18, at 321
("Prices were high in non-competitive markets, [defendants] contended, for
the same reason that other superstores had not entered those markets: costs
of doing business-for example, real estate rents-were high.").
3 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1084 ("The Court, however, cannot find that the
evidence submitted by the defendants with respect to other reasons for the
differences in pricing between one, two, and three firm markets is sufficient
to rebut the Commission's evidence.").
3 Baker & Pitofsky, supra note 18, at 319 n.17 (in Staples the FTC "made
what is likely the most extensive commitment of resources to econometric
analysis in any government antitrust case, before or since").
M See id. at 321 ("Judge Hogan later said he decided the case based on
company documents rather than the econometrics.").
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This, of course, is a general problem with econometrics, whether it
takes the form of regressions, merger simulations, or merger retro-
spectives. Although it can be more rigorous and powerful than other
types of evidence, it frequently suffers from data limitations or mod-
eling assumptions that render it questionable.
Judge Hogan's market definition analysis would have been more
precise had he asked whether the prices of other office supply retail-
ers were higher in geographic markets containing only one or two
superstore chains. Were they not-if other retailers' prices were essen-
tially the same regardless of the number of superstore chains in a geo-
graphic market-then the sale of office supplies by superstore chains
would have constituted a distinct product market even if superstore
prices were higher simply because superstore costs were higher. The
presence of other retailers would not have prevented the superstore
chains from raising their prices to reflect those higher costs. Market
definition is ultimately about the constraining power of other prod-
ucts. If superstore prices varied by geographic market, but other
retailers' prices did not, then those other retailers did not constrain
superstore prices-and thus should be excluded from the market-
whether or not superstore prices could be explained by higher costs.
3. COMPANY DOCUMENTS A document from one of the merging
firms that predicts an anticompetitive price increase after the merger
is perhaps the most prized exhibit the government can introduce. On
its face, it appears to establish the necessary likelihood of competitive
harm, since it seems to reflect the forecast of one of the merging
parties itself. In both Whole Foods and Staples, the courts cited such
documents. Judge Tatel quoted John Mackey's assertion that "By
buying [Wild Oats] we will . . . avoid nasty price wars in [several
cities where both companies have stores]."" Judge Hogan noted that a
Staples "document analyzing a possible acquisition of OfficeMax
referenced the '[b]enefits from pricing in [newly] noncompetitive
markets,' and also the fact that there was 'a potential margin lift
overall as the industry moves to 2 players.' "4() As alluring as these
9 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Tatel, J., concurring).
4 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1079.
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documents can be to the government, however, their probative value
is often limited: the document may refer to a minor anticompetitive
effect, the anticompetitive effect may be overshadowed by longer-run
procompetitive effects, the document may be authored by a low-
ranking executive, or it may be contradicted by many other
documents. In contrast, a document prepared by a high ranking
official for the company's board of directors that analyzes the
predicted consequences of the transaction may be of much greater
significance.
In addition, courts frequently rely on other, less dramatic com-
pany documents. In deciding the market definition issue, for exam-
ple, judges commonly cite documents from the merging parties that
reveal which companies or products the firms regard as their com-
petitors. In Staples, the court noted that "the merging parties evaluate
their 'competition' as the other office superstore firms, without refer-
ence to other retailers, mail order firms, or independent stationers."4 1
Documents that simply name "competitors," however, may be of lim-
ited utility. The competitors they identify may be rivals in the sense
that they occasionally take business from the merging parties, but
they may not be able to take enough business to prevent a postmerger
price increase. Alternatively, the documents may name only the firms'
principal rivals, leaving out smaller competitors who, in the aggre-
gate, would constrain the merged firm. More illuminating are docu-
ments that disclose which firms a merging party price checks or
monitors, since the extent of such monitoring is likely to be calibrated,
at least roughly, to the size of the competitive threat the merging firm
perceives.42
41 Id.
42 See Baker, supra note 24, at 141 ("evidence about the extent to which
firms monitor and respond to the price changes and new product introduc-
tions of rival sellers, and about the products and locations of the rivals that
have their greatest attention, is commonly employed as a guide to the prod-
ucts and locations where buyer substitution is the most likely"); Whole Foods,
548 F.3d at 1054 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("Whole Foods would not exam-
ine the locations of and price check conventional grocery stores if it were not
a competitor of those stores. Whole Foods does not price check Sports
Authority; Whole Foods does price check Safeway."). See also Staples, 970 F.
Supp. at 1080 ("[It is clear from the evidence that Staples and Office Depot
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4. CUSTOMER VIEWS Antitrust places considerable weight on
customer views. In part, this reflects the overarching goal of the
antitrust laws-protecting consumers from exploitation at the hands of
firms that have unjustifiably acquired market power." Because some
customers are consumers, and other customers' interests are generally
aligned with those of consumers," it makes sense to hear what the
people antitrust is trying to protect-or their surrogates-have to say
about the transaction." In addition, customers often have valuable
information. At the most basic level, they can tell the court which
products in the marketplace fulfill their needs. They may also be able
to testify on the ultimate predictive issue in market definition -
whether they would continue to purchase the merged firm's products
in the event of a significant and sustained postmerger price increase.
In Oracle, a vice president of DaimlerChrysler provided testimony on
both issues. He stated that "only SAP, PeopleSoft or Oracle could
service [DaimlerChrysler's] need for the [human resources]
management [software]." 6 He also declared that "if Oracle, SAP or
PeopleSoft were to increase their price for [human resources manage-
price check the other office superstores much more frequently and exten-
sively than they price check other retailers such as BJ's or Best Buy, and that
Staples and Office Depot are more concerned with keeping their prices in par-
ity with the other office superstores in their geographic areas than in under-
cutting Best Buy or a warehouse club.").
4 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191 (2008).
" See Thomas 0. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Priorities: A Year in
Review, Remarks Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 19,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj/atr/public/speeches/206455.htm
("Customer . . . incentives generally are aligned with our goals of protecting
competition.").
4 In the case of a merger of buyers that may create monopsony power,
antitrust's ultimate aim goal is to protect small suppliers from anticompeti-
tive exploitation. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 43. In such a case, it
would make sense to probe the views of suppliers.
46 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1125-26 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
HeinOnline  -- 56 Antitrust Bull. 559 2011
560 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 56, No. 3/Fall 2011
ment software] by 10 percent," he "would not consider an offer from
any other vendors."" Finally, customers who testify in opposition to a
merger deserve added credibility because they have to speak out
against a major supplier.'
Despite all these reasons to privilege customer testimony, it can be
unreliable and inaccurate. For example, in some instances customers
can be biased. Suppose that customer A buys relatively little of the
merging firm's product while its major rivals depend heavily on the
product. Customer A may testify in support of the merger, even
though it expects a significant price increase, because it will gain a
competitive advantage over its rivals if the merger takes place and
prices rise.4 9 Moreover, the customers who testify may not be represen-
tative of those who do not. This may occur if the customers are not
similarly situated, as in the bias example. But it can also occur because
of the same uncertainties that afflict judicial analysis of a merger: cus-
tomers may differ in their evaluations of the transaction and thus in
their predictions of its effects. And those who speak out may not share
the views of the much larger number of customers who do not.-
Id. at 1126.
48 See Heyer, supra note 7, at 121 ("In cases where knowledgeable cus-
tomers actually do step forward to incur the costs and risks associated with
testifying against their major suppliers, this fact alone-with appropriate
caveats for the various possible biases highlighted above-suggests that their
concerns are deeply felt, and quite possibly meritorious.").
49 See id. at 94 ("Often, intermediate customers compete downstream
against one another, and a merger can prove beneficial to some of them not
because the merger is good for final consumers but, rather, because the
merger harms the competitors of these customers (including, perhaps, poten-
tial entrants into these customers' line of business) by more than it harms
them."). Heyer's article also discusses other sources of customer bias.
See United States v. Engelhard, 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997)
("No matter how many customers in each end-use industry the Government
may have interviewed, those results cannot be predictive of the entire market
if those customers are not representative of the market."); United States v.
SunGard Data Systems, 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 191 (D.D.C. 2001) ("The sampling
of customer statements before the Court is minuscule when compared with
the entire universe of defendants' shared hotsite customers . . . . In addition,
the record does not indicate whether the customers cited by plaintiff are rep-
resentative of the entire universe of shared hotsite clients."). See also Oracle,
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Customer testimony may also be rejected because it is not ade-
quately supported. In Oracle, Judge Walker refused to rely on the
views of the government's customer witnesses, even though he
acknowledged that they were all "extremely sophisticated buyers and
users of information technology" with "decades of experience in nego-
tiating in this field,"" because none of them backed up their testimony
with a quantitative analysis of why they could not afford to turn to
alternative products in the event of a post merger price increase:
[Tihe issue is not what solutions the customers would like or prefer for
their data processing needs; the issue is what they could do in the event
of an anticompetitive price increase by a post-merger Oracle. Although
these witnesses speculated on that subject, their speculation was not
backed up by serious analysis that they had themselves performed or evi-
dence they presented .... [None gave testimony about the cost of alter-
natives to the hypothetical price increase a post-merger Oracle would
charge: e.g., how much outsourcing would actually cost, or how much it
would cost to adapt other vendors' products to the same functionality
that the Oracle and PeopleSoft products afford.52
While Judge Walker may have overreacted in this case, treating
useful predictions by customers as mere speculation," his basic point
seems valid. When customers are satisfied with their existing suppli-
331 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 ("Drawing generalized conclusions about an
extremely heterogeneous customer market based upon testimony from a
small sample is not only unreliable, it is nearly impossible.").
This objection would not apply if the customers who testify are represen-
tative of a subset of purchasers who are vulnerable to a postmerger price
increase because of the merged firms' ability to price discriminate against
them. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3 ("When price dis-
crimination is feasible, adverse competitive effects on targeted customers can
arise, even if such effects will not arise for other customers.").
51 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
32 Id.
5 See Heyer, supra note 7, at 103 (Walker's "inference appears highly
dubious in light of the mission-critical nature of the products in question, the
amount of money at stake in the procurements, and how knowledgeable and
sophisticated the customer witnesses were conceded by the court to have
been."); Baker, supra note 24, at 140 n.43 (Walker required "an expensive new
analysis that would not routinely be undertaken in the ordinary course of
business.").
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ers, they have little reason to explore alternatives, and being unfamil-
iar with them, may be happy to testify that they would not turn to
any other products in the event of a price rise. But if the challenged
merger actually leads to a price increase, and their profits fall as a
result, they may find themselves working hard to discover a cost-
effective alternative-and may learn that there is indeed one. For this
reason, customer testimony is more credible if it is supported by some
cost-benefit analysis of alternatives.
5. EXPERT TESTIMONY Each party in merger litigation normally
concludes its affirmative case with the testimony of its economic
experts.' Economic experts perform three principal functions in an
antitrust case. First, they synthesize the rest of the evidence from an
economic perspective, explaining what it means, as a matter of
economic theory, for the central issues in the case." Second, they
conduct their own quantitative analyses, which may range from
simple tabulations of relevant data to complicated econometrics. In
Oracle, for example, one of the government's economic experts,
Kenneth Elzinga, reviewed Oracle's discount approval forms and
simply counted the number of times particular firms appeared on
these forms, using that information to identify the participants in the
relevant market." In contrast, another government expert, James
McAfee, presented a full merger simulation," an advanced form of
econometrics discussed below. Finally, the economic experts on each
side critique the other side's experts, hoping to sow doubts about
their credibility and undermine their specific positions.
Economic experts play a central role in merger litigation and
judges usually (but not always) pay close attention to their testimony.
In Whole Foods, all three appellate opinions refer repeatedly to the
Although the parties may also present other experts-accountants,
management consultants, retired industry executives-they usually assign
the capstone role to economists.
5 See, e.g., Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (noting that one of the govern-
ment's experts had evaluated the implications of four other categories of evi-
dence for market definition).
6 See id. at 1145-46.
; See id. at 1169-70.
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views of the economists who appeared in the case.' In Oracle, Judge
Walker summarized and evaluated the testimony of each economic
expert.9 In Staples, however, Judge Hogan never mentioned any of the
economic experts.60 As all three cases indicate, moreover, that the testi-
mony of economists does not typically produce an objective answer
for the judge. Instead, both sides present economic experts, and on
most issues, they reach opposite conclusions. After all, each side's
experts are advocating a different scenario of the future, attempting to
persuade the court that theirs is the more accurate prediction.
6. MERGER SIMULATIONS In the last fifteen years, economists have
developed a technique that may eventually diminish the battle of
experts. As currently practiced, this technique, called merger
simulation, proceeds in two steps. First, the economist models the
premerger equilibrium. That is, she develops a set of equations, using
a theoretical model of competitive interaction that fits the firms and
products in question, and realistic empirical estimates of the
parameters of the model, and shows that these equations accurately
replicate (within a reasonable level of tolerance) the prices and
quantities that prevail premerger.61 In step two, the economist alters
one key feature of the model: she assumes that the merging firms are
no longer independently owned but instead set prices and quantities
jointly. She then determines new equilibrium prices and quantities.
The change between the original equilibrium and the new
equilibrium is the simulated impact of the merger.6 2
5 See generally FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F3d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir.
2008), id. at 1041 (Tatel, J., concurring), & id. at 1051 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
59 See generally Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
6 See generally FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
61 Most merger simulations use the Bertrand model of competition
among sellers of differentiated products. Others employ an auction model,
and some use the Coumot model.
62 See Heyer, supra note 7, at 123-24 ("Merger simulation is an attempt to
predict the post-merger pricing equilibrium by taking the premerger equilib-
rium, fitting it to an oligopoly model of how firms compete with one another,
and generating the equilibrium that would be produced by that oligopoly
model following the proposed merger."); Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden,
An Introduction to the Symposium on the Use of Simulation in Applied Industrial
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Merger simulation, moreover, can be expanded to encompass
variables other than price. Although it is employed almost exclusively
now to forecast the price and quantity effects of a merger, it can be
enlarged to predict the impact of a merger on product variety or other
dimensions of consumer choice.' In addition, if there are enough
data, merger simulation can predict the impact of a merger without
first defining a relevant market." Indeed, merger simulation can itself
establish the relevant market. If a simulation were to show that a
merger would result in a significant price increase on the merging
firms' products, but not on other products, then the simulation itself
would demonstrate that the merging firms' products constitute the
relevant market."
Despite its attractive features, merger simulation is still in its ado-
lescence. Although economists have been working on the approach
for over a decade and a half, and the enforcement agencies now use it
Organization, 7 INT'L J. EcoN. Bus. 133, 134 (2000) ("Merger simulation uses a
standard oligopoly model calibrated to observed prices and quantities to pre-
dict the effects of a merger on the prices and quantities of the merging firms
and their rivals."). See also Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simula-
tion in Competition Policy: A Survey, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1138682; Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simpli-
fled Approach with New Applications, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 883 (2001).
63 See Michaela Draganska, Michael J. Mazzeo & Katja Seim, Addressing
Endogenous Product Choice in an Empirical Analysis of Merger Effects, available
at http:/ /www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mazzeo/htm/dms
mergers.pdf.
64 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1122 (N.D. Cal.
2004) ("Merger simulation models may ... eliminate the need to, or lessen the
impact of, the arbitrariness inherent in defining the relevant market."); HORI-
ZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 6.1 ("merger simulation methods
need not rely on market definition"); David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An
Innovative Approach to an Old Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, 24 ANTITRUST
49, 49 (2009) (the new approach to hospital merger simulation developed by
FTC economists "does not require or depend upon market definition").
65 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.1.1 Ex. 5 (indicat-
ing that if a merger would result in a ten percent increase in the prices of
products A and B, while the prices of other products remain constant, then
products A and B would satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test for defining
a relevant product market).
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with some regularity to evaluate problematic mergers, the courts do
not yet rely on it. In Oracle, perhaps the first case to consider a full-
blown merger simulation,' Judge Walker rejected it because (in his
view) it did not reflect market realities. To begin with, it relied on an
auction model of competitive interaction: that is, it assumed that buy-
ers licensed software from sellers through a process that resembled an
English auction. In fact, according to the court, buyers procured soft-
ware through intense, protracted negotiations. Moreover, the results
of the simulation depended on the market shares of the relevant sell-
ers. In other words, rather than eliminating the need for market defi-
nition, this particular simulation model required a predetermined
market definition. Since Judge Walker had rejected the government's
market definition, the simulation, which relied on this definition, had
to be rejected as well.67
As Oracle indicates, a merger simulation is only as valuable as the
models and data-the assumptions and information-that are used to
construct it. At present, there are often problems with one or both
inputs.' In the future, however, the quality of both elements is likely
" See also Budzinski & Ruhmer, supra note 62, at 23 ("the Oracle/People-
Soft case was the first to have a full-blown merger simulation model to be dis-
cussed in an U.S. courtroom").
67 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1169-72 (N.D.
Cal. 2004). In a more recent case, an economic expert presented three simula-
tions in support of the FTC's unilateral effects theories, and the court refused
to accept any of them. Judge Collyer held that the expert had not obtained
enough data-his sample sizes were too small-to provide reliable estimates
of key variables in his models (diversion ratios and preference rankings). See
FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 68-72 (D.D.C. 2009).
6 See Budzinski & Ruhmer, supra note 62, at 25 ("Comprehensive and
precise data is required in order to calibrate [merger simulation models] so
that reliable results can be derived. In many markets, such data is simply not
available.") & id. ("[Tihe quality of the results depends on how adequate
(advanced!) Bertrand and Cournot models describe real market competition.
This might impose some limitations if neither class of models suffices to match
a given case as real-world competition is a complex and multifaceted phenom-
enon whose features reach beyond available advanced oligopoly models.").
In addition, merger simulation can be costly. See id. at 29 ("'direct' costs
like costs of data collection, payment for expertise, computer hours, man-
power, etc. as well as costs in terms of a potential extension of the duration of
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to improve as agencies and courts gain experience with simulations.
Economists will continue to develop better models, and as they do,
and the predictive power of merger simulation grows, the incentive to
collect more and better data will increase. Moreover, as the models
improve, they are likely to incorporate more variables of interest-
product choices, barriers to entry, service quality-not just prices and
quantities.' In short, as merger simulation becomes a more compre-
hensive and more accurate device, it may become our best single tool
for predicting the competitive impact of a merger. It is not clear, how-
ever, that it will ever eliminate the need to obtain the perspectives and
predictions of those who know the industry-company executives,
customers, and suppliers-because they are likely to be aware of
nuances in the industry's current state and future direction that eco-
nomic models cannot easily incorporate.
B. Likelihood of entry
Evaluating the likelihood of entry can be as important as market
definition: a merged firm could not impose a significant and sus-
tained price increase on its customers if they would promptly turn to
a new entrant. But despite its obvious significance, courts have
tended to neglect the entry issue, partly because determining the like-
lihood of new entry is often more difficult than market definition and
proceedings and possibly a reduction in legal certainty"). And to date, the
efforts to validate the predictive power of merger simulation have been few
and only partially successful. See Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The
Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Selected Case Studies
(NBER Working Paper 13859, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers
/w13859 ("there is little direct evidence on how successful these models are
in predicting price effects"); Dennis W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Will tle New
Guidelines Clarify or Obscure Antitrust Policy?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at
4 ("there is only weak empirical evidence establishing the usefulness of
merger simulation as a tool to predict anticompetitive mergers").
69 See Budzinski & Ruhmer, supra note 62, at 26 (at present, many "non-
price elements of competition-like e.g. barriers to entry and exit, buyer
power, brand, promotion and placement effects, shelf space competition,
strategy effects on/of market participants, etc.-can hardly be included in [a
merger simulation] since the available oligopoly and auction models do not
capture these dimensions of competition").
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partly because precedent allows them to do so. No court in recent
years has been reversed for failing to perform an adequate analysis of
the entry issue.70
1. SHORTCOMINGS IN JUDICIAL ANALYSIS Richard Zerbe and I have
reviewed every litigated federal merger decision since April 1992,
when the entry section of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the
Guidelines) was greatly enlarged. This review uncovered widespread
shortcomings in judicial analysis of the entry issue.7 1 For example,
only one of the thirty-five decisions we examined analyzed entry by
addressing each of the criteria laid out in the Guidelines-timeliness,
likelihood, and sufficiency. Moreover, in analyzing the likelihood of
entry, the courts rarely asked whether entry would be profitable-the
test in the Guidelines-but asked instead whether the relevant market
had entry barriers.
Only one of the thirty-five decisions actually defined an entry bar-
rier. The rest seemed to view an entry barrier as any obstacle that
reduces the speed or likelihood or impact of entry. While that notion
has merit-it meshes with the Guidelines' approach to entry and one
of the leading economic definitions of an entry barrier-it is not ade-
quate by itself to resolve the entry issue. Without establishing the
magnitude of such an obstacle, it is not possible to determine whether
it would impede entry so much that entry would be unlikely or
untimely or insufficient. Large capital requirements, for example, are
an entry barrier under the courts' approach, because they reduce the
number of potential entrants and thus the overall probability of entry.
They need not render entry unlikely, however, for a large firm could
find it profitable to enter despite the amount of capital required.
70 See John B. Kirkwood & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability:
Reinvigorating the Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 39,
43 (2009). As this article makes clear, the relevant issue is not the likelihood of
any entry at all, no matter how small the entrant or how slow the process, but
the likelihood of prompt and adequate entry-entry that will drive prices
back to the premerger level in a reasonably short period of time. As a result,
when I refer to the likelihood of entry, I mean the likelihood of timely and
sufficient entry.
7 See generally Kirkwood & Zerbe, supra note 70.
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This lack of rigor in appraising the entry issue often showed up in
other ways as well. The courts almost never analyzed the entry issue
in depth. To the contrary, their discussions of entry were usually brief,
typically occupying a page or a paragraph-or just a few sentences-in a
much longer opinion. In addition, several courts overlooked or com-
pletely misunderstood one of the Guidelines criteria. A few decisions, for
example, concluded that entry was unlikely simply because it was
costly-without asking whether it was profitable to incur those costs.
Indeed, the courts rarely focused on the profitability of entry, the funda-
mental determinant of its likelihood in economic theory and under the
Guidelines. None of the thirty-five decisions determined how much busi-
ness an entrant would need to be profitable, and only a small number
assessed the likely reactions of customers and established firms, even
though those reactions are critical to an entrant's success. Finally, almost
no case asked whether the prospects of new entry would be reduced if
the merger created the efficiencies the merging parties claimed it would.
Despite these shortcomings, no court at either the trial or the
appellate level was ever reversed on the entry issue. As a result, judges
have generally become comfortable with a quick look at entry condi-
tions, in which barriers are likely to be identified but their height not
determined, and the economic questions necessary to determine the
likelihood of entry are not raised or resolved. Of course, there have
been exceptions: the discussions of entry in CCC Holdings3 and Chicago
Bridge' are extensive and thoughtful, and Judge Hogan's opinions in
Staples' and Swedish Match' are quite sophisticated. But judicial analy-
sis of entry has not generally displayed the thoroughness or rigor of
judicial analysis of product market definition.
This lack of precision does not appear to have led to major compet-
itive problems. Since April 1992, no court has allowed an otherwise
anticompetitive merger on the ground that entry is easy.' During this
period, therefore, there were no false negatives attributable to judicial
72 FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26,46-60 (D.D.C. 2009).
7 Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 427-39 (5th Cir. 2008).
7 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086-88 (D.D.C. 1997).
7 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170-71 (D.D.C. 1997).
76 See Kirkwood & Zerbe, supra note 70, at 60.
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analysis of entry-harmful mergers allowed because of a court's mis-
taken belief that new entry would prevent a competitive problem.
There may have been false positives-procompetitive mergers blocked
because of an erroneous belief that the merger was harmful and that
new entry would not occur. But the retrospectives discussed below find
that the great majority of marginal mergers during this period resulted
in price increases, not price declines, which suggests that false positives
were rare. In short, it does not appear that the flaws in judicial analysis
of entry have resulted in substantial competitive harm. This does not
mean, of course, that the courts' current approach is ideal. It may have
resulted in errors in some cases, it undermines confidence in judicial
decision making, and it can be improved through modest and practical
reforms in the litigation process.
2. PROPOSED REFORMS Professor Zerbe and I have proposed a new
approach to litigating the entry issue. If defendants contend that new
entry would solve the merger's competitive problems, they would have
to identify a "path to profitability"-a business strategy that would likely
enable a new entrant (1) to attain enough sales to make its investment in
the market profitable and (2) to grow at a sufficient rate that its output
would drive prices and other terms of sale back to the premerger level
in a reasonably short period of time. If defendants satisfy this burden-
that is, if they introduce substantial evidence of a path to profitability-
then the government could nevertheless prevail by demonstrating that
the path is not viable-that barriers to entering the relevant market are
so high that new entry would not in fact satisfy all three of the
Guidelines' criteria.' This two-step approach would focus the parties
and the courts on the key likelihood issue-the profitability of entry-
without complicating the analysis so much that it becomes unworkable.
As this synopsis indicates, we assign great weight to profitability.
Like the Guidelines' and the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise,' we treat
77 In accord with United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990), the government would retain the ultimate burden of proof on the entry
issue. See id. at 989-92.
7$ HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3.3 ("An entry alterna-
tive is likely if it would be profitable.").
7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, [ 9 4 1g, at 236 (3d ed. 2009)
("Obviously, entry is not likely to occur unless it is profitable to the entrant.").
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entry as an investment decision and assume that firms will make this
decision based on its profitability. Some proponents of behavioral eco-
nomics, however, have questioned this assumption.
3. BEHAVIORALIST CHALLENGE In a recent article on the
implications of behavioral economics for antitrust, Amanda Reeves
and Maurice Stucke assert that firms do not always enter markets
when entry would be profitable. They state:
At other times, entry does not occur when it is economically rational.
Thus companies can maintain supracompetitive pricing in markets with
low entry barriers. Between 1988 and 1996, the [Department of Justice]
criminally prosecuted cartels in dozens of industries that, on the surface,
appear to have moderate or low entry barriers, including turtles, chain
link fences, and bicycle retailers. Other recent cartels involved college
textbooks, packaged ice, scrap metal, bid rigging at public real estate fore-
closure auctions, and retail gasoline and diesel fuel.'
In these instances, price fixing apparently occurred despite the pres-
ence of low entry barriers, a phenomenon that seems inconsistent
with the profitability assumption. Do these cases require that we jetti-
son-or substantially modify-that assumption?
That would be premature, because there are a number of possible
explanations for these episodes that are consistent with the profitabil-
ity assumption. Indeed, until these explanations are ruled out, it is
fair to say, as Gregory Werden, Luke Froeb and Mikhael Shor do, that
behavioral research has not actually shown that "entry fails to occur
when a profitability test indicates that it should."" On the other hand,
it is not clear that these explanations account for all of the cases
Reeves and Stucke cite. To the contrary, it may be true that in some of
these cases, entry did not occur even though it would have been prof-
itable. If so, it may be necessary to recognize some exceptions to the
profitability assumption. The issue cannot be resolved without more
information, however, because none of the cases has been studied in
80 Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND.
L.J. 1527, 1558 (2011) (footnotes omitted). See also Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral
Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twuenty-First Century, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
513, 565-66 (2007) (making the same point).
8 Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Behavioral
Antitrust and Merger Control 5 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
10-14, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1612282.
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sufficient depth to determine whether entry ever occurred, why it did
not occur sooner, or why it did not occur at all.82
There are at least four possible explanations for these episodes
that are consistent with the profitability assumption. First, entry may
have occurred in these cases as soon as potential entrants determined
that there had been an anticompetitive price increase in the relevant
market and set up the necessary operations. Although such entry
would not have prevented the price fixing altogether-and thus
would not have deprived the Justice Department of a basis for a crim-
inal prosecution-it could have forced prices back to the competitive
level in a relatively short period of time. As Areeda and Hovenkamp
note, "cartels can often be formed on a moment's notice and earn sig-
nificant profits even if entry in a few months' time will undermine
them."" Second, the cartels may have been largely or completely inef-
fective-that is, they did not raise prices a significant amount or
unraveled rapidly. If so, it would not have made sense for a firm to
enter the market; the profit opportunities were too small, or would
have disappeared too rapidly, to warrant the investment. Third,
potential entrants may not have been able to detect the price increases
or determine they were anticompetitive (i.e., not justified by higher
costs). As Reeves and Stucke note, the information necessary to
decide whether entry is warranted may be unavailable or expensive
to obtain.' Fourth, a close examination of these cases might reveal
that in some of them, the markets actually had substantial barriers to
entry, such as scale economies that were significant in relation to the
size of the market. Because of these possibilities, we cannot conclude,
without more information, that potential entrants failed to respond in
a rational way to the information and opportunities available to them.
At the same time, it is not possible to be confident that these expla-
nations account for every case that Reeves and Stucke identify. In some
82 See Stucke, supra note 80, at 578 ("there have not been any extensive
studies of the characteristics of these industries").
83 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 11 941a, at 210.
84 See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 80, at 1559 ("The behavioral finance
literature also suggests that sparse entry may result from the fact that the
information needed to make a rational decision about entry can be costly to
acquire, process, and verify.") (footnote omitted).
HeinOnline  -- 56 Antitrust Bull. 571 2011
572 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 56, No. 3/Fall 2011
of them, according to Professor Stucke, the Justice Department alleged
that the price-fixing conspiracy lasted for a number of years, and it
appears that both sunk costs and entry barriers were quite low." In
such cases, the Justice Department may well have been quicker at find-
ing and challenging the cartels than potential entrants were in identi-
fying the profit opportunity and seizing it. Given these instances, it is
difficult to conclude that the profitability assumption is always valid.
Before a behavioralist exception is created, however, we must con-
front another problem with the behavioralist critique: why is it that
potential entrants do not take advantage of profitable entry opportuni-
ties? Why do they leave money on the table? The principal explanation
Reeves and Stucke offer is that potential entrants may be excessively
risk averse.' But this explanation seems inconsistent with another phe-
nomenon behavioralist research has uncovered-excessive entry. After
a detailed review of the literature, Avishalom Tor concluded that a
great deal of small-scale entry takes place even though, by any objec-
tive measure, the entrant's expected profits are negative." An experi-
mental study published in the American Economic Review found the
same result." Reeves and Stucke attribute this phenomenon to a vari-
ety of psychological problems, including "optimism bias" and "wish-
ful thinking"-the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of your
own success and underestimate the chance of your failure." To be
K, In correspondence with me, Professor Stucke pointed to the scrap
metal case and the packaged ice case, in both of which the conspiracy
allegedly continued for approximately six years and the business was simple
to set up and operate.
8 See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 80, at 1559 ("individuals do not react
to risk and uncertainty as a rational profit maximizer would").
87 See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Dis-
cipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 490 (2002) ("The empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests that negative net present value entry is
commonplace.").
8 See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 301 (1999).
8 Reeves & Stucke, supra note 80, at 1557-58. See also Werden, Froeb &
Shor, supra note 81, at 10 ("Individuals tend to overestimate both their abilities to
perform skilled tasks and the likelihood that things will work out well. Overcon-
fidence is one of the psychological biases documented in the business world.").
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sure, excessive entry is not an important phenomenon for antitrust
policy Considerable evidence indicates that excessive entry is usually
"insufficient" entry: irrational entrants are typically small, fail quickly,
and have little or no impact on market outcomes." But excessive entry
does cast doubt on the notion that entrants are unduly risk averse.
Reeves and Stucke recognize the conflict and attempt to resolve it
by suggesting that potential entrants may be excessively optimistic in
some cases and excessively pessimistic in others. Citing the results of a
behavioral experiment, the authors propose that entrants may be exces-
sively optimistic when the task is easy and excessively pessimistic
when the task is difficult." But this solution runs squarely into a key
characteristic of the price-fixing cases mentioned earlier: in these cases,
entry barriers appeared to be modest. Yet if barriers appeared modest,
then entry would have appeared easy, not difficult, and potential
entrants should have been overconfident, not excessively risk averse.
Despite this problem with the underlying explanation, I am
reluctant, given the duration of some of the conspiracies cited, to dis-
miss the behavioralist critique altogether. Instead, I agree with
Reeves and Stucke that we need more studies of past antitrust cases,
both collusion cases and merger cases, in order to determine the
strength and scope of the profitability assumption." Until such stud-
ies produce a clearer explanation, I would suggest that courts adopt
90 See Kirkwood & Zerbe, supra note 70, at 50 n.60 (discussing the evi-
dence); see also Werden, Froeb & Shor, supra note 81, at 5 ("proponents of
behavioral antitrust argue that non-profit-maximizing entry almost certainly
is unsuccessful").
91 See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 80, at 1559.
92 Reeves and Stucke propose that the federal antitrust agencies conduct
systematic reviews of both merger cases and cartel prosecutions. See Reeves &
Stucke, supra note 80, at 1574. With respect to merger cases, they state that "the
federal antitrust agencies should conduct a post-merger analysis of any
merger subject to an extended Second Request review in which the agency:
(i) took no enforcement action; (ii) permitted the merger in part to be consum-
mated pursuant to a consent decree; or (iii) challenged the merger in court,
but lost. The antitrust agency, two to five years after the merger was consum-
mated, should examine the state of competition in that industry, including
pricing levels and non-price components . . . ." Id. To reduce the burden of
these reviews, Reeves and Stucke suggest that a detailed analysis of any case
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a rebuttable presumption. Specifically, they should presume that entry
decisions are dictated by their expected profitability, but allow the
government to rebut that presumption, if it can, in an individual case. 3
Unfortunately, the Guidelines preclude this approach. They retain the
should not be conducted unless a "quick-look review" indicated that compe-
tition had been significantly diminished.
While this proposal would increase the number of merger retrospectives,
and thus would have significant benefits, it may be overly ambitious, at least
initially. It would require the agencies to conduct dozens of quick-look
reviews each year and possibly a substantial number of in-depth retrospec-
tives as well. It may be better for the agencies to begin with a less expensive
pilot project, in which they select a sample of merger cases for a quick-look
review and, if warranted, a full retrospective. If this effort proves cost-effec-
tive, the agencies could expand it.
In a communication with me and others, Professor Roger Noll
observed: "The idea that the antitrust agencies should do more ex post
review has been around a long time, but with some occasional exceptions
it never happens because the incentive for top agency officials is to use
their scarce resources on today's issue, not yesterday's. I suspect that sys-
tematic, regularized ex post review can happen only in two ways: (1) Con-
gress mandates it and provides funds that cannot be used in another way,
or (2) another entity does it (maybe the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs, or maybe a non-profit financed by a foundation)." If Profes-
sor Noll is right, and a systematic program of retrospectives will not take
place unless Congress or another entity funds it, then it is particularly
desirable that the proposed program not appear to be overly expensive.
Former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic has repeatedly urged competi-
tion agencies to conduct regular retrospectives. See William E. Kovacic,
Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 129, 145 (2009) ("[Clompetition
authorities [should] expend resources devoted to performance measure-
ment. Agencies can ensure that, in every budget cycle, there are outlays
for evaluation."); William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies:
What Constitutes Good Performance? 16 CEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 924 (2009)
("Measuring program effectiveness is not an easy undertaking, but to say
that it is difficult is not a good reason to ask outsiders to accept effective-
ness as a matter of faith."); William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experi-
ments: Using Ex Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to
Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 861 (2001) ("Ex post
assessments of public enforcement measures provide a vital tool for ensur-
ing that government competition programs achieve desired ends.").
9 See Kirkwood & Zerbe, supra note 70, at 47 n.44.
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profitability assumption,4 and thus make it extremely unlikely that the
government would ever take a position inconsistent with it.
In Part IV, I assess the predictive power of merger analysis from a
different perspective. Instead of evaluating the strength of the analyti-
cal process the courts use, I examine the results of mergers that the
government and the courts did not block.
IV. MERGER RETROSPECTIVES
If merger control were perfect, the only transactions that would
occur would be those likely to enhance competition and benefit con-
sumers, suppliers, or both. If merger control were less than perfect, but
quite good overall, some mergers would harm competition but a
greater number would improve the competitive process. Notably,
studies of marginal mergers-mergers that would have been stopped
had the government and the courts been somewhat more aggressive-
do not find either result. Marginal mergers are not uniformly procom-
petitive, nor are more of them procompetitive than anticompetitive.
Instead, studies of past mergers-merger retrospectives-have found
that the vast majority of marginal mergers led to price increases.
A. The studies and their results
In the last three decades, there have been at least twenty-eight stud-
ies of consummated mergers, and those studies have examined at least
sixty mergers.' Unlike econometric studies of the relationship between,
9 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 9.2 ("Entry is likely
if it would be profitable.").
95 The following articles identify twenty-five merger retrospective stud-
ies, counting the study of five consumer product mergers that Ashenfelter &
Hosken themselves conducted: Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G.
Steven Olley, Merger Retrospective Studies: A Review, 23 ANTITRUST 34 (2008);
Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 119
(2003); Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68. In addition, economists at the
FrC have recently conducted three retrospective analyses of hospital mergers.
See Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on
Chicago's North Shore (FTC Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 294, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp294.pdf; Aileen Thompson,
The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New
Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (FTC Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 295,
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say, market concentration and firm profitability, which look for patterns
across markets, these studies examine individual mergers and attempt
to determine the impact of those particular mergers on the prices
charged by the merging firms.' Because answering that question still
requires controlling for other factors that may have affected prices, the
retrospectives, like the profit-concentration studies, normally employ
regression analysis, but they are case studies, not multimarket studies.
The vast majority of retrospectives find that the transaction they
examine--or where they investigate multiple mergers, half or more of
the transactions they examine-led to a price increase. Indeed,
approximately eighty percent of the mergers were found to have pro-
duced higher prices. 7 Most of the time, the price increases were not
dramatic: they usually ranged from two percent to ten percent." At
the middle and upper levels of this range, however, these increases
were surely significant," and if the volume of sales was large, even a
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp295.pdf; Steven
Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit
Transaction (FTC Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 293, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp293.pdf. These twenty-eight studies
examine at least sixty mergers. The number is imprecise because the articles
identify some merger retrospective studies without indicating whether the
studies examined a single transaction or several.
9 Although some of these studies also examine rivals' prices, few
attempt to evaluate the impact on nonprice variables like product choice.
9 More precisely, the twenty-eight merger retrospectives identified in
the articles cited above analyzed the effects of at least sixty-five mergers, and
of those sixty-five, price increases were found in fifty-two (eighty percent).
9 See generally Hunter, Leonard & Olley, supra note 95; Pautler, supra
note 95. For examples, see Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 35 ("In
four of the five mergers we investigated, prices appeared to increase a small
but significant amount, typically between 3% and 7%."); Hunter, Leonard &
Olley, supra note 95, at 40 ("McCabe analyzed the effects of seven mergers
involving publishers of biomedical journals that occurred in the 1990s . ...
McCabe found that the mergers led to price increases of 2 percent to 10 per-
cent.") (citing Mark J. McCabe, Journal Pricing and Mergers: A Portfolio
Approach, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 259 (2002)).
9 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.1.2 (indicating
that the enforcement agencies usually regard a price increase of five percent
as significant).
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two percent increase could have a significant adverse effect on cus-
tomers." Moreover, in some instances the price increases were strik-
ing. Michael Vita and Seth Sacher concluded that a hospital
acquisition in Santa Cruz allowed the acquiring hospital to raise
prices approximately twenty-five percent, an increase that could not
be explained by rising costs."o' Similarly, Deborah Haas-Wilson and
Christopher Garmon found that Evanston Northwestern Healthcare's
purchase of Highland Park Hospital permitted the combined institu-
tion to increase its net revenues per case by almost fifty percent
between 1999 and 2002.1" And Craig Peters estimated that the Conti-
nental-People Express merger was followed by a price increase (rela-
tive to an industry benchmark) of more than twenty-nine percent.0 '
Approximately one-fifth of the transactions, according to the stud-
ies, did not result in any significant price increases. In some cases, the
studies did not find any material change in prices; in others, the
reduction was small but significant'; and in a few, the decline was
substantial. Prices apparently dropped twenty-three percent follow-
ing the merger of Hawaii's two cement producers,"os and the combina-
"0 See Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 4 (noting that where the
amount of commerce is large, "the implied transfer from consumers to manu-
facturers is substantial").
101 Hunter, Leonard & Olley, supra note 95, at 39-40 (summarizing
Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-For-Profit Hospital
Mergers: A Case Study, 49 J. INDUS. EcoN. 63 (2001)).
102 See Haas-Wilson & Garmon, supra note 95.
103 See Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evi-
dence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & EcoN. 627, 641-42 (2006).
1 See, e.g., Hunter, Leonard & Olley, supra note 95, at 38 (describing the
Justice Department's informal study of the Whirlpool-Maytag merger, which
concluded that prices had fallen a limited but significant amount (relative to
what they would have been without the merger) because "the wholesale price
of washing machines . . . has fallen slightly since the merger [while] the cost
of inputs used in the production of washing machines has increased signifi-
cantly") (citing Thomas 0. Barnett, Current Issues in Merger Enforcement:
Thoughts on Theory, Litigation Practice, and Retrospectives (June 26, 2008),
available at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/234537.pdf).
103 See Pautler, supra note 95, at 180 (citing Laurence Schumann, Robert P.
Rogers & James D. Reitzes, Case Studies of the Price Effects of Horizontal
Mergers (FTC Bureau of Econ., 1992).
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tion of TWA and Ozark eventually resulted in fare reductions of fif-
teen percent.""'
As noted, though, the great majority of transactions examined led
to price increases, a pattern that other authors have observed. After
reviewing fourteen studies, Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Hosken
state: "All but one of these studies finds some evidence of price
increases following the mergers they study.""o7 Their own study of five
consumer products mergers reached a similar conclusion-small but
significant price increases in four out of the five transactions."o' In
another recent literature review, Hunter, Leonard and Olley declare:
"[Tihe majority of studies that analyze price effects have found post-
merger price increases.""
B. Implications
This pattern has two broad implications. First, the fact that the
vast majority of the price changes found were limited in size, rather
than dramatic, suggests that merger analysis is not severely off target.
If the predictive power of merger analysis was poor-if the courts
and enforcement agencies could not make reasonably reliable esti-
mates of the likely effects of proposed mergers-we would expect a
greater range of outcomes. As Ashenfelter and Hosken observe, the
absence of such sharp variation tends to counter the view that merger
control in the United States needs to be adjusted substantially:
[Slome advocates of less intervention may be surprised to learn that our best
estimate of the price effects of the marginal merger are positive, not negative
as would be the case if the marginal merger were producing large benefits to
consumers through the efficiency of the enlarged firm. Likewise, . . . some
advocates of more intervention may be surprised to learn that the marginal
merger is not producing huge anticompetitive price increases either."'
10 See id. at 171 (citing Steven A. Morrison, Airline Mergers: A Longer
View, 30 J. TRANSP. EcoN. & Pot'y 237 (1996).
107 Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 9.
1" Id. at 35.
109 Hunter, Leonard & Olley, supra note 95, at 34.
no Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 35. The absence of large price
increases or large price reductions in the retrospectives does not prove that
merger analysis is reasonably accurate. As I explain below, the retrospectives
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At the same time, the large proportion of prices increases found in the
merger retrospectives suggests that courts and enforcement agencies
have not been sufficiently aggressive in blocking mergers.
The retrospectives are not a random sample of all marginal merg-
ers,"' however, and would not justify a simple, across-the-board
increase in merger enforcement. To the contrary, most of them exam-
ine transactions in just four industries: airlines, hospitals, banking,
and petroleum.1 12 Moreover, most retrospectives take a relatively short
term perspective, assessing the impact of the merger in the first few
years after it occurred." They do not, as Ashenfelter and Hosken put
it, "measure the effects of the mergers on prices in the longer run
when the effects of some efficiency in the operation of the merged
firms may emerge."" Finally, virtually all of them look exclusively at
the effect of the merger on prices. They do not estimate its impact on
nonprice dimensions of competition such as service quality or prod-
uct choice."' Most merger retrospectives, in short, focus on a few
industries and examine the short term price consequences of a trans-
are not a random sample of all mergers or even of all marginal mergers: they
are limited in number, they focus on only a few industries, they concentrate
on short-term price effects, and they mostly find price increases rather than
price reductions. Still, they examine at least sixty-five mergers and find dra-
matic price changes only in a minority of cases, which is a positive sign.
nII Hunter, Leonard & Olley, supra note 95, at 40 ("the mergers that have
been analyzed cannot in any sense be claimed to represent a random sample
of all mergers or even 'marginal' mergers").
112 See, e.g., Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 9 ("Most existing
studies are in three historically regulated industries where pricing data are
publicly available: airlines, banking, and hospitals . . . . The other major
industry where the price effects of mergers have been examined is the petro-
leum industry.").
113 See, e.g., Haas-Wilson & Garmon, supra note 95 (evaluating price
changes within three-year period); Tenn, supra note 95 (estimating price
impact within two-year period); Peters, supra note 103 (observing price
changes in year after merger).
11 Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68, at 4.
115 See, e.g., id. ("We do not attempt to measure the benefits or costs to
consumers of changes in product selection.").
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action, not its longer-run impact on the entire array of competitive
offerings.
These limitations do not mean, however, that courts and enforce-
ment agencies should disregard the retrospectives. The total number
of studies is substantial (at least twenty-eight) and the number of
mergers examined is even larger (over sixty). In addition, although
most of the studies focus on just four industries, there are a significant
number that address other industries (seven), those studies examine a
substantial number of mergers (twenty), and a large percentage (sev-
enty percent) of these transactions were found to cause price
increases."' And even though most retrospectives do not evaluate
long run effects, those that do usually uncover higher prices, not price
reductions, over the longer term."' Finally, while only two studies
looked at nonprice effects, both found either no benefits or an adverse
effect."' In short, the retrospectives that range beyond the focus of the
majority of studies find broadly similar results.
For these reasons, the retrospectives ought to play some role in
the review of problematic mergers. That role should depend on the
strength of the other evidence of competitive impact and the simi-
larity of the merger in question to transactions previously exam-
116 See Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note 68; Barnett, supra note 104;
McCabe, supra note 98; Schumann, Rogers & Reitzes, supra note 105; John A.
Karikari, Stephen M. Brown, & Mehrzad Hadji, The Union Pacific/Southern
Pacific Railroads Merger: Effect of Trackage Rights on Rates, 22 J. REG. EcoN. 271
(2002); Joon Je Park, Michael W. Babcock & Kenneth Lemke, The Impact of Rail-
road Mergers on Grain Transportation Markets: A Kansas Case Study, 35 TRANSP.
RES. 269 (1999); David M. Barton & Roger Sherman, The Price and Profit Effects
of Horizontal Merger: A Case Study, 33 J. INDUS. EcoN. 165 (1984).
117 See, e.g., Vita & Sacher, supra note 101 (price increases found six years
after the merger); Morrison, supra note 106 (eight years after the transactions
occurred, higher prices found in two of three mergers).
118 See Pautler, supra note 95, at 167-68 (noting that one study found that
both of the airline mergers examined led to service reductions) (citing Gre-
gory J. Werden, Andrew S. Joskow & Richard L. Johnson, The Effects of Mergers
on Economic Performance: Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, 12 MAN-
AGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 341 (1991)); Peters, supra note 103 (one airline
merger resulted in a significant reduction in flight frequency; three others had
no significant effect on the number of flight options).
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ined. If the other evidence is close, if the merger is similar to trans-
actions previously studied, and if those studies consistently found
price increases, the retrospectives could tip the balance in favor of
stopping the merger. As is typically the case with merger analysis,
the specific facts matter: the power of the retrospectives would
turn on the degree to which they are likely to predict the competi-
tive effects of the merger, as opposed to the evidence collected by
the government and the parties. In most instances, the evidence col-
lected by the government and the parties is likely to furnish a more
reliable basis for prediction than the retrospectives. But in some
cases, the retrospectives may be sufficiently probative of probable
effects that they should be given significant weight in the final
analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I appraised the predictive power of merger analysis
in two ways. In part III, I examined the process courts use to resolve
merger challenges and assessed its rigor and sophistication, looking
at product market definition and the likelihood of entry. In the area of
product market definition, the predictive power of merger analysis is
reasonably strong: the courts employ a theoretically precise test,
examine multiple categories of evidence, devote a great deal of atten-
tion to the issue, and generally reach a defensible outcome. Even here,
however, the process remains complex and subjective; the evidence is
almost always voluminous and in conflict, and there is no simple
algorithm for weighing conflicting evidence.
Courts face the same evidentiary problems in resolving the likeli-
hood of new entry, but here their analysis is distinctly weaker. Instead
of working their way through the theoretically appropriate test-
would new entry be profitable?-they commonly resort to the simpler
question: Is the relevant market protected by entry barriers?
Although that inquiry is relevant to the likelihood of entry, it is not
dispositive unless the courts also measure the height of the barriers
they identify. Without measuring the height of an obstacle, it is not
possible to determine whether it would render new entry not just less
likely but unlikely. Most courts, however, do not evaluate the height
of the barriers they find-or address the profitability of new entry
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directly-and thus do not resolve the likelihood issue in an economi-
cally sound way.
In part IV, I appraised the predictive power of merger analysis in a
second way. I looked at the results of "marginal" mergers-mergers
that would have been blocked had the government and courts been
somewhat more aggressive. Measured in this way, merger analysis
does not seem to be seriously off target: the merger retrospectives
find that very few transactions led to either sharp price increases or
major price reductions. At the same time, though, the retrospectives
indicate that a large proportion of marginal mergers resulted in small
but significant price increases. This striking pattern does not support
a broad scale increase in merger enforcement, given the limitations of
the retrospectives, but it does suggest that in appropriate cases,
enforcement agencies and courts should be more willing to block
mergers. Such cases would tend to be marked by two characteristics:
the evidence collected by the government and the parties would not
supply a clear prediction of the merger's competitive effects, and the
merger would closely parallel transactions that have been found to
cause significant anticompetitive effects.
The predictive power of merger analysis is likely to grow in the
future as the enforcement agencies and courts continue to refine their
evaluation of proposed mergers. It is also likely to grow through the
further development and application of three techniques discussed in
this article: merger simulations, merger retrospectives, and the "path
to profitability.""' While these techniques are demanding, they hold
out the greatest promise of enhancing the predictive power of merger
analysis.
"' See Kirkwood & Zerbe, supra note 70.
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